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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the validity of some behavioral
conjectures as alternative explanations of bank risk-taking behavior. We
especially focus on the diﬀerent valuation of gains and losses relative to a
reference point, and the changing attitude toward risk conditional on the
domain (gains vs losses) features (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). We follow
a methodology based on Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) and the Fishburn
(1977) measure of risk, applied to a sample of banks from emerging market
economies. Preliminary results show that the Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
framework could provide an alternative for explaining risk-taking behavior in
the banking industry. Bankers located above benchmark levels, exhibit risk
aversion. Although, further investigations are needed in order to consolidate
our conclusions.
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1 Introduction and literature survey
In order to investigate the deviations of agents from traditional ﬁnance mod-
els, based on perfect information and coherent beliefs, behavioral ﬁnance
models based on cognitive psychology propose speciﬁc features of agents’ be-
havior, relaxing the individual rationality hypothesis (Shleifer 2000, Barberis
and Thaler 2002).
Another crucial feature of a model which aims at explaining trading be-
havior for example is the hypothesis made on investors preferences and the
way they evaluate risky choices. Prospect Theory is one of such theories, due
to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992). It
is the most successful one because of its capacity to capture and ﬁt results
obtained in the laboratory. Its starting point is a critique of the expected
utility theory as a descriptive model of decision making under risk. Follow-
ing experimental results, agents usually under-weight the probable results
compared to certain one (certainty eﬀect), which implies risk aversion when
gains are certain and risk loving when losses are certain. Agents also exhibit a
lack of coherence in their preferences when the same choice is diﬀerently pre-
sented (isolation eﬀect). The Prospect Theory’s formulation provides several
important features :
1. utility is deﬁned on the gains and losses, and not on the ﬁnal wealth
value,
2. the evaluation function form, particularly its concavity in the gains
domain - agents are risk-averse on the gains and risk loving on the
1losses - with a kink at the origin showing a greater sensibility to losses
(loss aversion),
3. non linear transformation of probabilities : small one are overestimated
and agents are more sensible to diﬀerences of probabilities at higher
probability’s levels.
The principals of judgment and perception are possible thanks to the use
of the value function. The value is treated as a function of 2 elements : the
asset’s value as a reference point and the amplitude of changing from this
starting point.
Prospect Theory features can be applied to study investor behavior (like
insuﬃcient or naive diversiﬁcation or excessive trading) (Odean 1998, Odean
1999, Barber and Odean 2000, Barber and T. 2001). Wiseman and Gomez-
Mejia (1998), for example, build a behavioral managerial risk taking agency
model, through the linkage of corporate governance mechanisms and prospect
theory features (especially framing problems). Agent’s risk aversion creates
opportunity costs for the principal, and this“risk diﬀerential”generates moral
hazard problems. The aim of corporate governance is thus to implement spe-
ciﬁc mechanisms in order to align the agent’s and principal’s interests. The
formulation of risk in standard agency theory is rather restrictive and naive,
assuming stable risk preferences. The main main contribution of Wiseman
and Gomez-Mejia (1998) concern an alternative risk formulation compared
to the agency theory, based on loss aversion and not risk aversion.
In a behavioral framework preferences will e unstable, due to the framing
feature, contrary to the agency theory which assume constant preferences.
The same choice can be presented in the potential gains or losses domain,
altering traditional agency theory results. In this framework, changing the
performance benchmark for the manager aﬀects its reference point (trans-
lating the gains and losses domains), and therefore may adversely alter its
risk taking behavior. Also, the use of compensation mix in order to establish
proper incentives for the manager, aligned with the principal interests, may
also adversely aﬀect agent’s risk taking behavior in such a framework.
The application of behavioral ﬁnance features to investigate risk-taking
2in the banking industry is of central interest in this paper. As far as we
know, this area has received scarce attention from the behavioral ﬁnance
perspective. Although, risk-taking remains the core activity of banks. It has
been proven that excessive risk taking1 is the principal bank default factor
(see for example Pantalone and Platt 1987 and O.C.C. 1988). The last 20
years have witnessed several bank failures throughout the world, particularly
in emerging market economies (EME) (Bell and Pain 2000). The interest for
bank failures comes mainly from its costs : ﬁnancial losses for the stakeholders
(shareholders, clients, deposits insurance fund), loss of competitiveness, and
a potential destabilization of the ﬁnancial system, through the contagion
mechanisms, when several individual failures lead to a banking crisis. The
resolution of these failures is a waste of resources, particularly scarce in EME
(Honohan 1997)2.
Several explanations of the excessive risk taking sources can be found
in the literature : ineﬃcient corporate governance mechanisms (Gorton and
Rosen 1995, Knopf and Teall 1996, Anderson and Fraser 2000), inadequate
bank capital regulation (Koehn and Santomero 1980, Kim and Santomero
1988, Keeley and Furlong 1990, Rochet 1992), intense market competition
(Keeley 1990, Covitz and Heitﬁeld 1999, Cordella and Yeyati 2002), and an
adverse regulatory, institutional and legal environment Barth et al. (1999,
2000, 2001, 2002) and LaPorta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000).
Alternative explanations of excessive risk taking in banks seem neglected.
As risk-taking decisions are made upon human subjective judgment and es-
pecially perception of risk, it seems quite natural to engage within the behav-
ioral perspective to better investigate and understand this process. Therefore,
the core aim of this paper is to engage in this way. We investigate empiri-
cally risk taking in the banking industry in a Cumulative Prospect Theory
framework.
1Which can be deﬁned as a level of risk-taking which ampliﬁes the bank’s probability
of default above an acceptable level by the diﬀerent partners of the bank, especially the
shareholders and the regulator.
2For example, the banking crisis in Indonesia (1997) and Thailand (1997-98) costed
about 50-55% and 42.3% of the GDP respectively in term of restructurization (ﬁscal con-
tribution).
3The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
methodology and the data used in this study. Section 3 presents the results
and their discussion. Finally, section 4 provides a preliminary conclusion and
further research perspectives.
2 Methodology and data
Jegers (1991) adopts the Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) approach in order
to study the risk-return relationship using belgian accounting data for diﬀer-
ent industries for the 1977-82 period and several measures of return and risk.
Following Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988), the positive correlation between
risk and return implying a risk-averse attitude of the ﬁrms, irrespective of
their returns, does not always hold. In this case, Bowman (1980, 1982) ﬁnd-
ings are of particular interest, the basis of the so-called risk-return paradox.
The prospect theory’s feature stipulating that risk attitude is determined by
the outcome’s relation to a reference point and not the outcome’s level is
particularly relevant in this case. Therefore, some testable hypothesis are
provided by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) framework : when performance
is below a given target level, decision makers should be risk-seeking, and
when performance is above the target level, they should be risk-averse.
In terms of the risk-return relation, these predictions mean that in a
group of ﬁrms with above-target returns, risk and return should be positively
correlated, whereas they should negatively correlated in a group of below-
target returns ﬁrms. Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) tested these predictions
using accounting data, deﬁning benchmark returns as median returns, and
dividing the ﬁrms of their sample in two groups - above and below target.
Their results strongly corroboratedthe presented prospect theory predictions.
Jegers (1991) replicates Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988)’s methodology
using Belgian accounting data, testing some new return and risk variables,
like ROA (return on assets) in addition to ROE (return on equity), which
should take into account managerial performance view, and cash ﬂow on
equity in order to refute the attacks of the accounting based performance
measures concept, and a coeﬃcient of variation, deﬁned as the standard
4deviation of returns divided by the average return, in addition to the variance
of returns. Jegers (1991) calculates each ﬁrm’s time average return, ranks
ﬁrms according to these values, and divide the ﬁrms into 2 equally sized
groups : those with above and respectively below target returns, the target
being deﬁned as the median return. Then, for each group, Spearman rank
correlations between return and risk and the negative association ratio are
calculated. The results corroborate those of Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988).
Johnson (1994) also places his analysis of risk-taking in banks in a be-
havioral ﬁnance framework, following Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988), and
using Fishburn (1977) measure of risk, deﬁned as a dispersion about the
mean outcome. The principal aim of the study is to examine the power of
prospect theory and Fishburn (1977)’s measure of risk to explain variability
of accounting measures and to diﬀerentiate between alternative deﬁnitions of
target outcomes in the banking industry.
Johnson (1994) tests several measures of return and risk for a sample
of US commercial banks for the 1970-89 period. He uses standard mea-
sures of return like ROA and ROE, as well as primary capital ratio. Risk is
measured as standard deviation of outcome. The study aims at examining
historical data to determine whether there is any evidence consistent with
prospect theory, by measuring the relationship between outcome variability
and distance from target. Targets are deﬁned as the median values of return
variables. Banks are classiﬁed in two separate groups according to this tar-
get, and correlation between distance to target and standard deviations are
computed. The statistical tests are based on Kendall τ correlation coeﬃcient.
The obtained results conﬁrm these hypothesis and corroborate Fiegenbaum
and Thomas (1988) conclusions.
In the present study, we follow Johnson (1994)’s methodology for the
formalization of the tested hypothesis. As far as we know, empirical evi-
dence based on prospect theory features for the banking industry are scarce.
Although, bank risk-taking remains a subjective human activity, relying on
human risk perception3. This is the ﬁrst motivation for this work.
3Even if automated risk management techniques are making great progress in the bank-
ing industry, the role of so-called soft information produced by the (human) manager
5We focus on the banking industry, but in a speciﬁc framework - emerging
market economies - where risk-taking behavior can become adverse, generat-
ing excessive risks and therefore amplifying bank’s default probability, aﬀect-
ing negatively the whole economy, as stated in the introduction. The speci-
ﬁcities of these economies, mainly historical heritage (political, economic,
social, moral, ...), restructuring process in progress, rapidly evolving eco-
nomic reality, inadequate regulatory, institutional and legal environment,
...may foster excessive risk taking, aﬀecting the perception of risk by the
bankers. For example, an evolving economic environment force the banker to
constantly adapt his appreciation of risk. An inadequate institutional or legal
environment may bias banker’s risk perception. Therefore, an investigation
of this risk perception in a behavioral ﬁnance framework is suitable.
We use a pooled sample of 894 commercial banks for the 1996-2001 period
from 2 main areas of emerging market economies - South-East Asia and South
and Latin America (see table 1). The accounting data come from Bankscope.
We have cleaned and bounded the data, in order to obtain a homogenous
sample of commercial banks (dropping small banks) which main activity is
loan making and deposit taking.
We have calculated several return and risk measures, following the ex-
isting literature, but also trying to propose some alternative measures. Our
tests rely on time average and their standard deviations measures, as well as
median of these variables.
The variables used in this study are deﬁned in table 2.
Concerning the return measures, we use traditional ones, like the ROE
(reﬂecting rather the shareholder point of view), the ROA (reﬂecting rather
the management point of view) and the EQTA (reﬂecting as well the share-
holder and the management points of view, and also the regulator’s). Some
new attempts concern the SPREAD1 and SPREAD2 measures which focus
more precisely on the bank’s credit activity, and should give a more adequate
perspective on return in commercial banks.
Concerning the risk measures, apart from the standard deviations of the
return variables, we also investigate the usefulness of standard deviations of
remains crucial within the risk taking process.















Table 2: Variables deﬁnition
Variables Calculation
ROE Net Income / Equity
ROA Net Income / Total Assets
EQTA Equity / Total Assets
SPREAD1 Interest Income / Total Loans
SPREAD2 Interest Income / Total Operating Income
NPLGL Non Performing Loans / Gross Loans
LLRNPL Loan Losses Reserves / Non Performing Loans
LLRGL Loan Losses Reserves / Gross Loans
NLTA Net Loans / Total Assets
7the“loss measures”mainly NPLGL (reﬂecting a potential loss for the bank),
LLRNPL, LLRGL (both reﬂecting management’s perception of risk and its
coverage with reserves which alter the proﬁtability of the bank) and NLTA
(which reﬂects both potential future returns but also potential problems in
term of reserves and/or losses).
We are aware of the fact that some other measures should be investigated.
This is left for further research.
We also attempt to investigate the framing issue, testing the correlations
between risk and return measures in diﬀerent domains - gains versus losses.
Therefore, we test the signiﬁcance of the correlation coeﬃcient between mea-
sures of return and risk crossing the domains (gains and losses).
3 Results and discussion
3.1 Results using median as benchmark
We calculate time average of the variables as well as their standard deviations.
The medians of the employed measures represent the target levels. The
Fishburn’s measures of risk are the distance of the variable from this target
level. We build 9 zones for which we have ABOVE and BELOW areas using
the target level. These zones are : Zone 1 - ROE, Zone 2 - ROA, Zone 3 -
EQTA, Zone 4 - SPREAD1, Zone 5 - SPREAD2, Zone 6 - NPLGL, Zone 7
- LLRNPL, Zone 8 - LLRGL, Zone 9 - NLTA.
For each zone we split the sample in 2 areas : ABOVE and BELOW,
corresponding respectively to banks above and below the target level - the
median of the variable corresponding to the zone. For the following tables 3
and 4, we compute Kendall τ correlation coeﬃcients between the standard
deviation of the variable and the distance to the target level corresponding
to the zone and by area4.
4The Kendall τ correlation coeﬃcient measures the strength of the relationship between
2 variables, and like Spearman’s rank correlation, is carried out on the ranks of the data.
It ranges from +1 to −1, with a positive correlation indicating that the ranks of both
variables increase together, whilst a negative correlation indicates that the rank of one
variable increases the other one decreases. Its main advantage is the possibility for direct
8Table 3: Correlations results between standard deviation and distance to
benchmark measures (gain domains)
Area Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Zone 5
(ROE) (ROA) (EQTA) (SPREAD1) (SPREAD2)
ABOVE −0.0851∗∗ −0.0962∗∗∗ −0.0418 −0.1706∗∗∗ −0.1498∗∗
BELOW 0.1675 0.1772∗ 0.0115 0.0464 −0.0357
Kendall τ correlation coeﬃcients between the standard deviation
and the distance to median are shown for each zone, by area.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ : statistically signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Concerning the correlation results in the gain domains for the Zones 1-
5, we observe signiﬁcant and negative Kendall τ coeﬃcents for each zone
(except Zone 3 corresponding to the EQTA variable) in the ABOVE area.
We can interpret these results in the following way : for banks located above
the target level in the gains domain, bankers exhibit a risk averse behavior, as
the standard deviation and the distance to median are negatively correlated.
It may correspond to a“defensive attitude”, as being above the target in term
of outcome imply to conserve the privileged position, and therefore exhibiting
risk aversion. For banks located below the target level, the relationship
between these 2 measures is not signiﬁcant5.
Concerning the correlation results in the loss domains for the Zones 6-
9, we observe more mixed evidence. In the ABOVE area, except for the
Zone 9, corresponding to the NLTA variable, other Kendall coeﬃcients are
weakly signiﬁcantly negative, the coeﬃcient being not signiﬁcant for Zone 8
(LLRGL variable). For banks above the target levels in term of potential
losses (NPLGL) or their coverage (LLRNPL), bankers exhibit a risk aversion
behavior. Having for examples a level of NPLGL above the target level imply
a more risk averse attitude, as these potential losses may drive the bank into
default. The Kendall correlation coeﬃcients for the BELOW area are all not
signiﬁcant.
interpretation of the statistic in terms of probabilities of observingconcordantor discordant
pairs.
5Although their positive values would indicate a risk loving behavior.
9Table 4: Correlations results between standard deviation and distance to
benchmark measures (loss domains)
Area Zone 6 Zone 7 Zone 8 Zone 9
(NPLGL) (LLRNPL) (LLRGL) (NLTA)
ABOVE −0.1182∗ −0.0635∗ −0.0824 −0.0996∗∗∗
BELOW 0.0045 −0.1734 −0.028 0.0513
Kendall τ correlation coeﬃcients between the standard deviation
and the distance to median are shown for each zone, by area.
∗∗∗ and ∗ : statistically signiﬁcant at 1% and 10% levels.
In the 2 following tables 5 and 6 we propose to cross the domains (gains
vs losses) in an attempt to investigate the framing issue which is one of the
crucial features of Prospect Theory. The same choice may be presented in
alternative ways (as a gain versus as a loss), aﬀecting the editing phase of
an agent, and therefore aﬀecting its preferences. We do this in the following
manner : in the table 5 we show Kendall correlation coeﬃcients between
standard deviations of gain measures (ROE, ROA, SPREAD1, SPREAD2)
and distance to median losses measures (NPLGL, LLRNPL, LLRGL, NLTA,
corresponding to the Zones 6-9). In the table 6, we invert the measures,
showing Kendall coeﬃcients between standard deviations of loss measures
and distance to median gains measures (Zones 1-5).
Concerning the results shown in table 5, we observe signiﬁcant Kendall
τ correlation coeﬃcients only for the BELOW areas for Zone 6 and Zone 8,
and for the ABOVE area for Zone 9. The results for the BELOW areas seem
to indicate that banks located below target levels in terms of potential losses
(NPLGL) and their (costly) coverage (LLRGL) exhibit risk loving behavior,
as the relationship between the distance to median and standard deviations
of return measures are signiﬁcantly positive. Being under such target “leave
room”for aggressive risk taking within the bank. As to the ABOVE results,
we observe signiﬁcantly negative Kendall coeﬃcients between the distance to
target in terms of NLTA and the standard deviation of the return measures.
This may be interpreted as a feature of risk aversion on the side of the
10Table 5: Correlations results between standard deviation and distance to benchmark measures (cross gain vs loss
domains)
Zone 6 Zone 7 Zone 8 Zone 9
(NPLGL) (LLRNPL) (LLRGL) (NLTA)
ABOVE BELOW ABOVE BELOW ABOVE BELOW ABOVE BELOW
SDROE 0.0859 0.0901∗∗∗ −0.0294 −0.0758 0.0748 0.089∗∗ −0.0811∗∗ −0.0478
SDROA 0.0977 0.0919∗∗∗ −0.0287 −0.0963 0.085 0.0958∗∗ −0.0835∗∗ −0.079
SDSPREAD1 0.0979 0.0955∗∗∗ −0.0181 −0.0881 0.0843 0.1037∗∗∗ −0.0779∗∗ −0.16
SDSPREAD2 0.0784 0.0788∗∗∗ −0.0209 −0.1167 0.0573 0.0956∗∗ −0.075∗∗ −0.0257
Kendall τ correlation coeﬃcients between the standard deviation and the distance to median are shown for each zone,
by area. ∗∗∗ and ∗∗ : statistically signiﬁcant at 1% and 5% levels respectively.
1
1banker, as being above a target level of loans volume compared to total assets
restrain the risk taking attitude materialized in terms of standard deviations
of return variables. This volume of loans represent potential revenues but
may also transform into NPL, enhancing the bank’s risk of default, contrary
to NPLGL or LLRGL variables, which proxy expost excessive risk taking,
already materialized.
Turning to the interpretation of the results in table 6, we observe signif-
icant negative Kendall τ correlation coeﬃcients only for the ABOVE areas
for Zones 2-5. Concerning the Zone 2, corresponding to the ROA variable,
we can interpret these results as indicating risk averse behavior rather on the
management side, as the relationship between the distance to the ROA target
and the standard deviation of losses measures is negative6. Concerning the
Zone 3, corresponding to the EQTA variable, we also observe signiﬁcantly
negative Kendall τ correlation coeﬃcients between the distance to EQTA
target and standard deviations of losses measures (except for the standard
deviation of NLTA). We can interpret this result in a similar manner as for the
Zone 2, except that it may reﬂect in this case the shareholders point of view,
as they are the main contributor to the bank’s equity. Banks located above
the EQTA target exhibit risk avert behavior, as the distance to this target
is a proxy measure of the equity cushion or franchise value, which expected
loss seems to discipline the risk taking behavior. Finally, concerning the re-
sults for the Zones 4 and 5, we also observe signiﬁcantly negative Kendall
correlation coeﬃcients between the distances to SPREAD1 and SPREAD2
target levels and the standard deviations of loss measures. This may also
be interpreted as risk adverse behavior feature, as being located above such
level implies a more prudent and conservative risk taking behavior.
We observe that in a loss framework, being below a target level seems
to aﬀect bank risk taking in a risk loving fashion. On the contrary, in a
gain framework, being above a target level have a signiﬁcant impact on risk
taking, in a rather risk aversion fashion.
6This relationship is not signiﬁcant for the Zone 1 (ROE - shareholder point of view).
12Table 6: Correlations results between standard deviation and distance to benchmark measures (cross loss vs gain
domains)
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Zone 5
(ROE) (ROA) (EQTA) (SPREAD1) (SPREAD2)
A. B. A. B. A. B. A. B. A. B.
SDNPLGL −0.0511 0.1455 −0.069∗∗ 0.0214 −0.1321∗∗ 0.0371 −0.2177∗∗∗ 0.0101 −0.1931∗∗∗ −0.0183
SDLLRNPL −0.05 0.1195 −0.067∗∗ −0.0013 −0.1118∗ 0.035 −0.2075∗∗∗ 0.0007 −0.1823∗∗∗ −0.0272
SDLLRGL −0.0545 0.1221 −0.0738∗∗ 0.0013 −0.1264∗∗ 0.0338 −0.2108∗∗∗ 0.0103 −0.1877∗∗∗ −0.0187
SDNLTA −0.0585∗ 0.1169 −0.0771∗∗ 0.0013 0.1165∗ 0.0359 −0.2135∗∗∗ 0.0004 −0.1789∗∗∗ −0.0145
Kendall τ correlation coeﬃcients between the standard deviation and the distance to median are shown for each zone, by area.
∗∗∗ and ∗∗ : statistically signiﬁcant at 1% and 5% levels respectively.
A.: ABOVE, B.: BELOW.
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34 Conclusion and future research perspectives
Cumulative Prospect Theory provides an alternative framework for risk tak-
ing analysis, especially excessive risk taking in banks, which remains the
major determinant of their failure. Although, the literature dealing with
these issues remain scarce.
This paper is an attempt to empirically investigate the usefulness of the
behavioral framework for risk-taking analysis in banks from emerging market
economies.
Preliminary results tend to support the usefulness and pertinency of the
Cumulative Prospect Theory features as alternative explanations for risk
taking behavior within banks. Banks located above target level (measured
in several diﬀerent ways) tend to exhibit risk adverse behavior.
Further investigations are needed in order to better understand the be-
havioral ﬁnance contribution to risk taking analysis in banks.
First, other benchmark variables should be tested in order to study the
robustness of the obtained results (for example mean or maximum values, as
well as benchmark values calculated for best agency rated banks).
Second, it would be interesting to apply tournament and ranks theories
(Brown, Harlow, and Stark 1996, Busse 2001, Taylor 2003), especially to
investigate rating grades eﬀect on risk taking behavior, and the quantiﬁcation
of rating’s default probability, in order to test the probabilities’ deformation
with an adequate methodology - a crucial prospect theory feature.
These are the main perspectives for future research, which is under progress
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